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Abstract
This study estimates the earning losses of workers experiencing an involuntary job separation. We
employ, for the first time in the earning losses literature, a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood
estimator with fixed effects that has several advantages with respect to conventional fixed effects
models. The Poisson estimator allows considering the full set of involuntary separations, including
those with zero labor market earnings because of unemployment. By including individuals with
zero earnings and by using our new method, the loss in the year of separation becomes larger than
in previous studies. The loss starts with roughly 30 percent and, although it quickly shrinks, it
remains at around 15 percent in the following years. In addition, we find that compared to other
reasons for separation, the earning loss pattern is unique for involuntary separations, because no
other type of separation implies such permanent scarring. This latter finding makes us confident
that the self-reported involuntariness of a separation is a reliable source of information.
Keywords: wage trajectories, job loss, earning loss, PPML.
JEL Classification: C33, J31, J63.
∗ We thank the Swiss Federal Statistical Office for data provision and John Addison, Isabel Baumann, Eric Bettinger,
Simon Janssen, Edward Lazear, and the participants at the 15th colloquium on personnel economics in Paderborn for
helpful comments. This study is partly funded by the Swiss Federal Office for Professional Education and Technology
through its Leading House on the Economics of Education, Firm Behavior and Training Policies. We are grateful to the
Editor and two anonymous referees for their time and effort invested in this paper.
† Research associate at the Graduate School of Business at the University of Zurich, Switzerland. Corresponding
author: simone.balestra@uzh.ch
‡ Full professor at the Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology at the University
of Zurich, Switzerland.
1 Introduction
In the last two decades, concerns about the plight of job loss have been a relevant issue for both
researchers and policymakers (Couch and Placzek, 2010; Eriksson, 2006; Hijzen et al., 2010). Previous
studies analyzing job losses, or “involuntary separations” as we call them, have shown that this type of
job loss implies monetary costs in terms of immediate wage reductions (Curti, 1998; Monks and Pizer,
1998) and non-monetary costs in terms of re-employment conditions (Farber, 2010; Polsky, 1999). It
remains unclear, however, whether and to what extent these wage reductions are lasting.
To fill this gap, the purpose of this paper is to shed light on the effects of involuntary separations
on wages in the long term. To do this, we first estimate the earnings losses of those who find re-
employment over several years after an involuntary job loss. Second, we are not only interested in
measuring earnings losses of those that are re-employed, but we are also interested in the total foregone
earnings or the total productivity loss of those that experience unemployment spells. Therefore, in
a second step we also include unemployed workers with zero earnings in our analysis. To do so, we
have to use a new empirical approach: a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator similar to
the one applied to gravity models (Lameli et al., 2014). Including these “zeros” is important for at
least two reasons. First, by considering the zeros, we are no longer only measuring firm-specific loss
of human capital (Addison and Portugal, 1989; Carrington, 1993; Neal, 1995) but instead estimating
the total foregone productivity caused by an involuntary separation.1 The unanswered question here
is whether these productivity losses are also long-lasting or whether they affect only the year of
separation. Second, from the methodological side, it reduces the selection bias due to the exclusion of
one portion of the population, as underlined by von Wachter et al. (2008).
In a third step we also investigate the determinants of an involuntary separation, asking whether
quantity and type of education can act as a protection against job loss. Previous literature (Kettunen,
1997; Mincer, 1991) suggests that unemployment incidences are lower among highly educated workers.
For example, Polsky (1999) shows that college education is negatively correlated with job separation.
In this paper, we consider for the first time both educational level (i.e., years of schooling) and type
of education (i.e., academic or vocational).
Our data source is the Swiss Labor Force Survey from 1996 to 2009, a rotating panel representative
of the adult population permanently living in Switzerland. It is produced annually by the Swiss Federal
Statistical Office, and the main advantage of this data source is that we can fully observe the reason of
each job separation. Therefore, we can distinguish between workers who separated involuntarily from
those who separated voluntarily or left for other reasons (e.g., injury, working conditions, or personal
issues) and obtain valid estimates of the wage trajectories following an individual before, during, and
after an involuntary job loss. Furthermore, we can compare the earnings patterns for different types
of separation to test whether the consequences of self-reported reasons for separation are in line with
1For example, if we did not include these zeros, we would analyze the wage losses of those workers who directly find
a job after separation, excluding all individuals experiencing an unemployment spell.
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our theoretical expectations.
Our results show that wage losses following an involuntary separation are significant and long-
lasting. We find that separated workers without unemployment spells suffer an immediate wage
reduction of about 7 percent, which remains statistically significant for at least four years after sepa-
ration. This is in line with results of previous studies. However, if we include unemployed individuals,
i.e. with zero earnings to get an estimate for total productivity loss, we find losses of 30 percent in the
year of separation and a long-term loss of about 15 percent four years after separation. These losses
are much larger and can be seen as an indicator of the total productivity loss caused by an involuntary
separation, as they comprise both zero labor market productivity during unemployment and the loss
of firm-specific human capital that is reflected by the lower wages after re-employment (Addison and
Portugal, 1989).
Compared to other reasons for separation, this earnings loss pattern is unique for involuntary
separations, because no other type of separation is followed by such permanent scarring. Regarding
the role of education, we find that tertiary education—in the form of academic or vocational tertiary
education alike—plays a major role in reducing the risk of job loss.
2 Theory and Empirical Background
Economic theory suggests that worker mobility has important repercussions on wage trajectories
(Topel, 1991). In general, the impact of labor mobility on wage trajectories can be either positive
(wage gain) or negative (wage loss), depending on the individual human capital endowment (Fallick,
1996), the individual characteristics (Ruggles and Ruggles, 1977), and the type of separation (Lazear,
2009).
From a human capital perspective (Becker, 1962), wage losses occur if separated workers have not
only general human capital but also firm-specific human capital. If an individual with a large portion
of specific human capital loses the job, the consequences of the separation will be more severe than
for an individual who has more general human capital. Because firm-specific skills do not increase
the workers’ productivity outside a particular firm, workers with a large stock of firm-specific human
capital cannot transfer to a firm in which productivity—and thus wages—will be as high. If we
take this theoretical argument literally, we should always expect a loss associated with a separation,
independent of the type of separation. However, such is not always the case, as many job changes—
especially voluntary ones—result in wage gains (Altonji and Williams, 1992; Antel, 1991).
Somewhat different patterns can be expected when referring to Lazear’s skill-weights approach
(Lazear, 2009) to explain differences in earnings losses across different types of separations. In Lazear’s
model, all skills are general but firms use them in different combinations with different weights at-
tached to them. The advantage of his view of human capital is that it provides a more differentiated
explanation of wage changes following a separation. According to Lazear’s model, the expected wage
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change is likely to be negative whenever turnover is involuntary, because if workers choose not to move
they have difficulties in finding a firm with exactly the same skill-weights profile on the external labor
market. This implies a negative wage change in terms of expected wages (keeping market thickness
constant). Conversely, we should expect a positive wage change for voluntary leavers (quitters), be-
cause the quitters would be those who only go if they find an outside offer with a favorable skill-weights
profile.
A similar conclusion arises from mobility and search models, which predict different long-term
wage trajectories for movers and for stayers. Mobility models also distinguish between voluntary
and involuntary mobility, suggesting that layoffs are usually associated with earnings losses, whereas
quits are associated with wage gains (Bingley and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2006). The explanation for
these patterns is due to the presence of unemployment spells and worker human capital endowments
(Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981). Taken together, these theoretical arguments suggest that we should
indeed observe wage changes after a separation. However, in which direction such wage changes go—
either positive or negative—depends on the type of separation. We should expect persistent earnings
losses whenever the firm initiates the separation (layoffs), whereas we should expect a wage gain
whenever the worker initiates the separation (quits).
From the empirical perspective, Monks and Pizer (1998) present early evidence on involuntary
separations. They use data from the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey to estimate the increase
in the probability of changing jobs from 1971 to 1990, and identify how much of this change was
voluntary. Overall, they find a positive trend in the probability of job turnover of about 13 percent,
mostly consisting of an increase in the probability of involuntary separation. Confirming Monks and
Pizer’s results, Polsky (1999) examines the consequences of job loss between 1976-81 and 1986-91. In
general, he finds stability in the incidence of job separation but a significant increase in the incidence
of involuntary job loss relative to voluntarily quitting. Polsky also shows that the consequences
of involuntary separation worsen over time: The re-employment rate of workers who experienced
involuntary job loss drops from 67 percent to 62 percent in 15 years. Moreover, among those who
found new jobs, the odds of receiving a considerable wage cut rose from 9 percent to 17 percent during
the same period. When these earnings losses start and whether they are long lasting remains unclear
at this point.
Regarding the persistence of earnings losses after separation, Ruhm (1991) introduces the concept
of long-lasting scars following job displacements. Using household data from the Michigan Panel
Study of Income Dynamics, he shows that four years after displacement, displaced workers continue
to earn 10-13 percent less than their non-displaced counterparts. The methodological standard for the
earnings losses literature is Jacobson et al. (1993), who use administrative data2 combining workers’
earnings histories with information about their firms to estimate the magnitude and temporal pattern
of displaced workers’ earnings losses. They find that high-tenure workers separating from distressed
2Administrative records of the State of Pennsylvania, 1974-1986.
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firms suffer an immediate loss of more than 40 percent and a long-term loss of about 25 percent per
year.
Couch and Placzek (2010) argue that past estimates and the size of those reductions vary strongly
with the type of data used and the state of the business cycle, demonstrating that under ordinary
economic conditions, earnings losses are smaller than the estimations of Jacobson et al. White (2010)
obtains similar results, finding the typical displaced worker realizing total long-term losses of USD
34,065, equivalent to an 11-percent loss compared to the earnings of similar non-displaced workers.
However, the literature on earnings losses focuses primarily on displaced workers, who are high-tenured
individuals who have been involuntarily separated due to plant closings or mass layoff.3 This focus
on displacements is meant to avoid selection problems: Displacements are considered exogenous and
usually affect the entire workforce to the same extent. However, the selection problem then remains
at the firm level, because establishments that have to close are likely to be in the low-performing tail
of the distribution of plants and most likely also workers (Cornelissen and Hu¨bler, 2011; Hijzen et al.,
2010).
In contrast to the U.S. evidence, most European studies find displacement losses rather small and
not always long-lasting (Couch, 2001; Eliason and Storrie, 2006; Hijzen et al., 2010). As European
countries usually have stronger labor market regulations in which wages are bargained between em-
ployers and unions for each industrial sector, earnings losses studies for European workers generally
find small losses, often significant only in the short term. Given these differences between regulated
and non-regulated labor markets, it is particularly interesting to study the effects in Switzerland. This
is because Swiss labor market regulations are more like in the U.S. than in many European countries,
but many other economic conditions are very close to the European model (e.g., the educational sys-
tem). This unique feature of Switzerland makes it interesting to study the determinants of involuntary
separations, as we do in a second step during our empirical analysis. Given the literature and the
Swiss institutional setting, we thus expect to find earnings losses following a separation. In terms of
magnitude, Swiss estimates probably range between U.S. and European estimates, because, in spite
of the Swiss low-regulated market, Switzerland also has low unemployment rates and an important
social security system.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We base the analysis on data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) between 1996 and 2009.4
The Swiss Federal Statistical Office produces the SLFS annually and it is representative for the adult
population permanently living in Switzerland. This includes Swiss citizens whose main residence is
3The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics definition of a displaced worker is [s]omeone at least 20 years old, with at least
three years of tenure on a job, who lost that job due to slack work, abolition of a position or shift, or plant closing or
relocation.
4For detailed information, methodological procedures, and data availability please visit: www.slfs.bfs.admin.ch.
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Switzerland and foreigners who stay for at least 12 months in Switzerland, aged 15 and over. The main
purpose of the SLFS is to provide information on the structure of the labor force and employment
behavior patterns. It is strictly adherent to international definitions (e.g., of the International Labor
Organization), particularly concerning the definition of employment, unemployment and the different
working time concepts. This allows Swiss data to be compared with OECD, European, and U.S. data.
The SLFS is a rotating panel based on a sample of some 30,000 interviews per year in the consid-
ered period, in which four-fifths of the households from the previous year’s survey are re-interviewed.
This enables accurate monitoring of labor market trends and insightful analysis of individual employ-
ment histories over several years. Moreover, sampling errors in the measurement of changes can be
minimized and the sample remains representative of the population living in Switzerland. The sur-
veys take place annually in the second quarter and are carried out using Computer Aided Telephone
Interviews (CATI). Although the SLFS has low attrition rates,5 some individuals are lost as a result
of change of residence, emigration, death, or refusal to further participate until the final survey. A
logit model calculates the probability of such a failure due to the characteristics of the individuals
(age, gender, previous investments, etc.). This model is then used to weight the data and to prevent
nonrandom attrition.
With this data set we are able to distinguish the involuntary separations from all other types of
separations, in addition to the classical demographic, educational, and occupational characteristics.
From a question asking the reason for the last job loss, we can isolate those who separated involuntarily
from those who separated for other reasons, such as quit, retirement, injury, working conditions, limited
contract, or personal issues. Thus, we are able to achieve valid estimates of the earnings pattern by
observing a worker before, during, and after an involuntary separation. Since one might be concerned
that asking people about the reasons for their separation might not reveal the true reasons but rather
socially desirable answers, we address the problem by analyzing earnings losses for each other type of
separation (e.g., quit) to see whether the respective results are consistent with what one would expect
from theory if the answers were correct. For example, we should observe that (on average) voluntary
separations go together with wage gains and not wage losses.
To avoid special circumstances, such as those that might arise from retirement, our sample takes
into account only individuals aged 18-65. We also restrict the sample to individuals who are either
employed or unemployed, so as to avoid misspecification due to people who are in school, retired,
or not active in the labor force. The earnings variables come from the Swiss Survey on Income and
Living Conditions, a very precise data source for income resulting from labor activity. Thus, for those
who are unemployed at the time of the interview, we have zero earnings in the data.
After creating the panel and removing missing values, we are left with a sample of 67,590 obser-
vations, divided among 13,518 individuals. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. Over the period
1996-2009, the incidence of a job loss due to involuntary separation is 7.07 percent. Over the same
5The response rate is 65-72 percent for the initial interview and 83-89 percent for the following.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Involuntary separation 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Annual income 66,478 39,326 0.00 571,654
Hourly wage 34.73 16.83 0.00 173.41
Weekly working hours 35.96 12.51 0.00 97.00
Male 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
Age 42.22 9.84 18.00 65.00
Full-time worker 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00
Swiss 0.75 0.44 0.00 1.00
Tenure (in years) 9.86 8.88 0.00 48.41
Firm size ≥ 50 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Years of schooling 13.39 2.44 9.00 18.00
Primary education 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Secondary education 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
Tertiary education 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Mandatory education 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Vocational education 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00
Academic education 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Observations 67,590
Notes: Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
period, the average worker works 36 hours per week, earns 34.73 Swiss Francs6 (CHF) per hour, and
has a net annual income of CHF 66,478. Almost 70 percent of the sample has a full-time employment
for the entire period of observation.
4 Methods
4.1 The Wage Equation
To quantify the earnings losses and their temporal pattern, we employ an approach similar to Jacobson
et al. (1993) by defining a worker’s earnings loss as the difference between his or her observed and
expected earnings had the events that led to the job loss not occurred. Letting yit denote the earnings
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of worker i in period t and letting Si,s = 1 if worker i experienced an involuntary separation at time
s (and Si,s = 0 otherwise
8), the definition of the loss is hereafter illustrated:9
E(yit | Si,s = 1, Ii,s−v)− E(yit | Si,s = 0 ∀ s, Ii,s−v) (1)
6Wages are inflated to the year 2010. In 2010, 1 CHF = 1 USD. In Switzerland, inflation is very low and stable over
time.
7We use the net annual income and the hourly wage as earning measures.
8“Otherwise” denotes individuals who did not experience an involuntary separation, but it does not necessarily
exclude the possibility that they separated for other reasons. We also performed our investigation by comparing those
who involuntarily separated with those who did not separate at all, with results similar to those we present in section 5.
We stay with our approach because it better represents the typical working life of an employee.
9The index t refers to continuous time, whereas the index s refers to the time relative to the separation.
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where Ii,s−v is an information set at time (s− v) containing individual-specific earnings determinants
(either observable or unobservable), regardless of whether the individual experienced an involuntary
separation. We also assume v to be sufficiently large that the events that led to separation have not
yet begun. We focus on the first reported separation only, because any subsequent separation is likely
to be endogenous (Stevens, 1997).
The earnings in a given period are assumed to depend on the event of an involuntary separation
and on some controls for fixed- and time-varying characteristics. Thus we can rewrite the earnings
equation as follows:10
ln(yit) = αi + γt +X
′
itβ +
4∑
k=−4
δk · Skit + εit (2)
Note that equation (2) is not defined for observations with zero earnings. To overcome this issue, we
take the exponential on both sides of equation (2) and obtain our model of interest:
yit = exp[αi + γt +X
′
itβ +
4∑
k=−4
δk · Skit + εit] (3)
which can be defined for any zero or positive yit. In equation (3), the individual fixed effect αi captures
the impact of time-invariant differences among individuals in observed and unobserved characteristics,
and γt is a set of dummy variables for each year in the sample that gauges the general time pattern
of earnings. The vector Xit consists of the observed, time-varying characteristics of the individual.
As most available variables—such tenure or occupation—might be endogenous to the involuntary job
loss and thus constitute a form of separation costs themselves, we restrict our controls to age (as
proxy for labor market experience), age squared, and interactions among these controls and gender.
We nevertheless provide regressions with additional controls (tenure, tenure squared, firms size, and
occupation dummies), which are presented and discussed in section 5.
The set of dummy variables Skit represents the event of involuntary separation and δk measures the
effect of such job loss in the years before, during, and after separation. Specifically, Skit = 1 if worker
i experienced an involuntary separation k years prior to (k is then negative), during (k equals zero),
or since (k is positive) year t; and Skit = 0 if individual i experienced no involuntary job loss during
period t. Therefore, decomposing the sum
∑
δk · Skit yields a measure of the earnings loss during each
year k.
4.2 Estimation Strategy
In the earning losses literature, the conventional empirical approach would be log-linearize equation
(3) and estimate it by fixed-effects (Couch, 2001; Jacobson et al., 1993; Kletzer and Fairlie, 2003;
Stevens, 1997; White, 2010; Zwick, 2012). OLS estimates with no individual fixed effects are probably
10Consistent with the literature, we assume that the conditional expectation function of the dependent variable is
described by a constant-elasticity model of the form yi = exp(xiβ) (Heckman and Polachek, 1974).
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biased because of the endogeneity of different types of job losses and because of the unobservable
worker characteristics that may cause them. Researchers’ inability to distinguish between workers
with high or low productivity, leads to a sample of involuntary separations that might not properly
represent the overall working population. We use the panel structure of our data to mitigate this
selection bias by filtering out the time-constant heterogeneity at the individual level with the within
transformation.
Two general problems, still not properly covered in the existing literature, remain. The first
problem concerns the practice of interpreting the parameters of log-linear models estimated by least
squares as semi-elasticity. This practice can be misleading, especially in the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity and measurement error. With heteroskedastic errors, the log-linear model does not consistently
estimate the semi-elasticities.11 Because of this issue, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that
constant elasticity models should preferably not be linearized but rather estimated by Poisson pseudo
maximum likelihood (PPML). Furthermore, due to Jensen’s inequality, in log-linear models we cannot
predict levels, because the expected value of the logarithm of a random variable is different from the
logarithm of its expected value.
The second problem is related to the specification of the dependent variable, the natural logarithm
of earnings. If an individual is unemployed at the time of the interview, his or her earnings resulting
from labor market activity are zero. The logarithm of zero is undefined, and we are left with an
unbalanced panel. Including the zeros has at least three advantages. First, it allows us to fully exploit
the sample of individuals who experienced an involuntary separation. Second, it mitigates the selection
problem because job separation affects the probability of working (von Wachter et al., 2008). Third,
it introduces a new measure of losses, because we otherwise exclude all spells with zero earnings. If
we include the zeros, we are not only measuring the earning loss after re-employment due to a loss of
specific human capital but rather the total loss resulting from an involuntary separation. We call this
new measure “productivity loss,” because it reflects the value of the forgone productivity while the
worker is not active in the labor market. The unanswered question is whether the productivity loss is
also long-lasting or whether it affects only the year of separation.
To simultaneously overcome both these problems, we use a PPML estimator similar to the one
introduced by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and further discussed in Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2011). The PPML estimator identifies the coefficients using the same first-order conditions that are
used by the maximum-likelihood estimator derived from the Poisson distribution. However, the PPML
estimator does not require the dependent variable to be Poisson distributed (Gourieroux et al., 1984).
Following Cameron and Trivedi (2013), we can estimate the parameters of interest by solving the
11With heteroskedastic ε, E(ε|x) = f(x) and E(y|x) = exp(x′β)f(x). In this case, ∂E(y|x)/∂x 6= β.
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following set of first-order conditions:
n∑
i=1
[yi − exp(xiβ)] · xi = 0 (4)
The PPML approach can be seen as a nonlinear-least-square specification of an equation with uni-
form weights given to observations.12 Without further information—or assumptions—on the pattern
of heteroskedasticity, giving the same weight to all observations is the more natural way of proceed-
ing.13 In terms of estimated parameters, PPML has two main differences with respect to OLS. First,
as already underlined, the coefficients of PPML do not suffer from bias that arises from estimating
semi-elasticities with a log-linear model. Second, PPML allows for predictions of wage levels and not
only in terms of log-wages as in the case of OLS.
Another important feature of the PPML estimator is that it does not require the dependent
variable to be an integer, and it is also consistent in the presence of over-dispersion (Fally, 2015).14
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011) provide additional evidence
on the good performance of PPML by presenting a simulation study using different heteroskedas-
ticity patterns, and showing that the PPML estimator is the least biased of various OLS functional
forms, non-linear least squares, Tobit models, gamma pseudo-maximum-likelihood methods, and in
the presence of a large fraction of zeros in the dependent variable.
Finally, the PPML approach can be applied to panel data, with the use of PPML with fixed effects
(Fally, 2015; Wooldridge, 1999). This PPML panel estimator is consistent to serial correlation but
requires the appropriate robust standard errors suggested by Wooldridge (1999) for valid inference.15
Considering all these advantages, we decided to use the PPML approach, which has never been applied
to research on separations and earning losses.
5 Empirical Findings
5.1 Effect of Involuntary Separation on Annual Income and Hourly Wage
Table 2 provides estimates of equation (3) using fixed-effects PPML (columns 1 and 2) and conventional
fixed-effects methods (columns 3 and 4). The number of observations in Table 2 is lower than the one
reported in the descriptive statistics because we exclude—for now—observations with zero earnings.
We do so because we want to compare the marginal effects obtained with PPML to those obtained
using conventional fixed-effects. In Table 2 we restrict our controls to age, age squared, and interactions
12A necessary condition for the PPML estimator to be consistent is that the conditional mean is correctly specified.
We can test this assumption with a RESET test. The result of such test performed on our sample has a p-value of 0.869,
which means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the functional form of the conditional expectation function
is correctly specified.
13We reject the null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan test at all conventional levels of significance (p-value < 0.000).
14Over-dispersion means that the variance exceeds the mean, a common data property in applied research (Cameron
and Trivedi, 2013).
15To do so, we use the Stata command xtpqml, publicly available at http://people.bu.edu/tsimcoe/data.html.
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Table 2: Earning Effects of Involuntary Separations, ppml and fe models
PPML with fixed effects Fixed effects estimation
Variables Annual income Hourly wage ln(annual income) ln(hourly wage)
dY/dX dY/dX dY/dX dY/dX
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3 years before separation 0.005 -0.017 -0.011 -0.019
(0.013) (0.034) (0.028) (0.024)
2 years before separation -0.012 -0.024 -0.027 -0.023
(0.012) (0.033) (0.026) (0.022)
1 year before separation -0.024* -0.037 -0.052* -0.035*
(0.013) (0.032) (0.027) (0.021)
Year of separation -0.066*** -0.068* -0.104*** -0.071***
(0.017) (0.035) (0.032) (0.024)
1 year after separation -0.076*** -0.073** -0.120*** -0.084***
(0.018) (0.037) (0.033) (0.026)
2 years after separation -0.080*** -0.101*** -0.132*** -0.098***
(0.018) (0.039) (0.034) (0.026)
3 years after separation -0.062*** -0.095** -0.114*** -0.101***
(0.020) (0.041) (0.036) (0.029)
4 years after separation -0.074*** -0.091** -0.113*** -0.093***
(0.021) (0.043) (0.039) (0.030)
Individual fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
(Pseudo) R2 0.218 0.059 0.227 0.064
N 66,255 66,255 66,255 66,255
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in
parenthesis. All models include a constant and the following controls: age, age squared, and interactions
between gender and age variables. The pseudo R2 is computed as the square of the correlation between the
dependent variable and its fitted values.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
among these controls and gender. Although we recognize that tenure and occupation are important
earnings determinants, we also recognize that those variables are likely to be endogenous, thus biasing
the estimated effects. Therefore, we base our main analysis on regressions including a simple set of
predetermined controls, and provide separately in appendix Table A.1 results with additional controls
(tenure, tenure squared, firm size, and occupation dummies).16
In terms of annual income (table 2, column 1), the marginal effects of the post-separation dummies
are negative and significant at the 1 percent level, from the year of involuntary job loss up to four years
thereafter. Individuals who experience an involuntary separation have—on average—an immediate loss
in annual income of 6.6 percent and a long-term loss of 6.2 percent three years after separation and
7.4 percent four years after separation. Conventional fixed-effects estimation provides larger marginal
effects, ranging from an immediate 10-percent loss to a long-term loss of 11 percent. However, these
latter estimates are biased due to Jensen’s inequality and the presence of heteroskedasticity. The
difference in effect size between PPML and conventional fixed effects is rather large, casting some
doubts on the effects documented by the literature so far.
As we already discussed, one of the advantages of using PPML is that we can provide predictions
16Adding additional controls produces results similar to the ones presented in the main analysis.
10
in earning levels instead of log-earnings, which are difficult to interpret and rather uninformative.
Furthermore, we are not only interested in the statistical significance of our results but also—as
suggested by Kra¨mer (2012)—care about their importance in the labor market context we analyze.
To give economic significance to our results, we estimate the total losses in actual earnings and compare
it to the average annual earnings. In terms of Swiss Francs, the typical involuntarily separated worker
loses on average about CHF 4,400 in the year of separation and roughly CHF 5,000 four years after
separation, compared with their expected income had the separation never happened. Altogether, the
average post-separation loss within the first four years amounts to CHF 23,790, which represents 36
percent of a year’s wage (on average).
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2 present estimates with hourly wage and the log of hourly wage as the
dependent variable. We do this additional analysis for two reasons: First, the hourly wage takes into
account the potential reduction in working hours in the new job; and, second, the hourly wage filters
out company bonuses and other potential biases not related to productivity. The post-separation
marginal effects are all negative and significant, with an immediate wage loss of 6.8 percent and a
wage loss of 9.1 percent four years later. Hourly wage losses are slightly larger than annual income
losses, suggesting that re-employed workers suffer from not only a wage cut but also a reduction in
working hours. In terms of Swiss Francs, the typical involuntarily separated worker loses on average
CHF 3 per hour worked in the years following a separation, compared with their expected income
had the separation never happened. Altogether, the average post-separation loss within the first four
years amounts to CHF 15 per hour worked, which corresponds to 43 percent of the mean hourly wage.
Looking at the marginal effects estimated by fixed effects reveals that, once again, conventional fixed
effects overestimate the real effect of a separation.
These first estimates constitute an important result, because they give clear evidence of the
consequences of an involuntary separation, an event that jeopardizes an individual’s earnings not only
at the moment of separation but also in the long run. This supports the theoretical argument that
involuntary separations involve a permanent loss of parts of human capital. Looking at the time
pattern of earning losses, we note that there is no sign of a complete recovery in the first four years
after an involuntary separation. This is somewhat different from what the literature usually finds
(Couch and Placzek, 2010), but we consider a time interval that might be too short to observe a wage
recovery;17 studies with similar time intervals also estimate no post-separation recovery (Kletzer and
Fairlie, 2003; Ruhm, 1991).
Table 3 reports regression outputs if we include individuals with zero earnings from labor market
activities. As we discussed previously, the PPML approach allows us to include such individuals in
the analysis, and thus estimate the total productivity loss caused by an involuntary separation. As for
Table 2, the first two columns of Table 3 present results with the annual income as dependent variable,
17In the displacement literature, this time interval ranges between two years after separation (Couch and Placzek,
2010) and twenty years after separation (von Wachter et al., 2008).
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Table 3: Earning Effects of Involuntary Separations, including zeros
PPML with Fixed Effects
Variables Annual income Annual income Hourly wage Hourly wage
dY/dX dY/dX dY/dX dY/dX
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3 years before separation 0.003 0.005 -0.015 -0.013
(0.016) (0.017) (0.031) (0.027)
2 years before separation -0.011 -0.009 -0.022 -0.020
(0.015) (0.015) (0.030) (0.027)
1 year before separation -0.044** -0.041** -0.060* -0.054*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.032) (0.028)
Year of separation -0.338*** -0.355*** -0.418*** -0.393***
(0.044) (0.051) (0.076) (0.069)
1 year after separation -0.149*** -0.164*** -0.165*** -0.169***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.043) (0.041)
2 years after separation -0.130*** -0.143*** -0.161*** -0.163***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.043) (0.040)
3 years after separation -0.116*** -0.128*** -0.158*** -0.159***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.045) (0.042)
4 years after separation -0.134*** -0.144*** -0.163*** -0.161***
(0.031) (0.034) (0.049) (0.045)
Individual fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Further controls NO YES NO YES
R2 0.220 0.229 0.082 0.080
N 67,590 67,590 67,590 67,590
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in
parenthesis. All models include a constant and the following controls: age, age squared, and interactions
between gender and age variables. The pseudo R2 is computed as the square of the correlation between the
dependent variable and its fitted values. The full set of controls also entails tenure, tenure squared, an
indicator whether the firm has more than 50 employees, and occupation dummies.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
whereas columns 3 and 4 present results with the hourly wage as dependent variable. In columns 2
and 4 we additionally control for tenure, occupation, and firm size. However, adding further controls
does not change the estimated marginal effects dramatically.
A look at the set of dummies representing the post-separation loss reveals that the coefficients are
all negative and significant at the one percent level. In terms of annual income, involuntarily separated
workers suffer from an immediate loss of 33.8 percent in the year of separation and a long-term loss
of 11.6 percent and 13.4 percent in the third and fourth year after separation, respectively. As before,
in terms of hourly wage the estimated losses are slightly larger. We find an immediate loss of 41.8
percent (per hour) and a long-term loss around 16 percent (per hour) for the third and fourth year
after separation.
Including the zeros in the analysis has a large impact on the immediate loss. This large immediate
loss shrinks quickly and stabilizes in the years following a separation. However, the estimated effects
including the zeros never converge to the effects obtained without the zeros, suggesting that both the
earning loss and the foregone productivity persist in the long run.
As commonly found in the earning losses literature, involuntarily separated workers already ex-
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perience a small earning loss one year before separation. According to our estimates, this loss is on
the order of 3-5 percent in we exclude the zeros (table 2) and 4-6 percent if we include the zeros (table
3). The presence of a pre-separation loss is usually attributed to wage renegotiation aimed at avoiding
separation or to negative time-varying unobservables for those who lose their jobs later (Zwick, 2012).
This latter case is a potential threat to internal validity, because it would suggest that involuntary job
losses are not conditionally exogenous. However, because the pre-separation loss is small and similar
throughout all regressions, it indicates either that the impact of negative time-varying unobservables
is negligible or that these negative time-varying unobservables affect all separated individuals to the
same extent (which is rather unlikely). We further discuss this issue in the concluding section.
5.2 Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of our estimates and test the sensitivity of our results, we perform two
analyses. First, we repeat the regressions of section 5.1 for sub-samples of the data, to verify that the
estimated effects are not arising from specific groups of the population. Given that the results of this
first robustness check are very similar to the ones presented in the main analysis, they are available
in the web appendix. Second, we implement the same econometric specifications to other reasons for
separation, to verify the plausibility of the self-reported separation measure.
We might be concerned that elements like type of employment (full-time or part-time), age,
or gender drive the effects we estimate in the main analysis. Therefore, to test the sensitivity of our
results, Table A.2 in the web appendix presents sub-sample analyses according to type of employment,
age intervals, and gender. In columns 1 and 2, we study the earning losses of workers that lose a full-
time job and are re-employed in another full-time job. We do so because this type of workers are likely
to be high productive, and if our identification strategy based upon fixed-effects is invalid, we should
observe different results for the sub-sample of full-time workers.18 The regression outputs in columns
1 and 2 show earning losses (either including zeros or not) that are in line with the main analysis,
indicating that our fixed-effects are controlling effectively for time-constant individual heterogeneity.
The next robustness check pertains the potential impact of early retirement and education on re-
employment probability. We thus exclude individuals that are younger than 30 years and older than 55,
to make sure that the sample is not influenced by individuals in education or retiring earlier. Columns
3 and 4 of Table A.2 present regression outputs for the age-restricted sample, showing marginal effects
that are in line with the ones depicted in Table 3. This suggests that neither early retirement nor
education are driving the results.
Finally, as common in the literature, we run a separate regression for men to make sure that
gender is not determining the significance and magnitude of the earning losses. Columns 5 and 6 of
Table A.2 in the web appendix present the results and show the same loss pattern and significance as
in the main analysis. In terms of magnitude, however, it appears that men suffer from slightly smaller
18Bo¨heim and Weber (2010) use a similar strategy to identify the signaling effect of marginal employment in Germany.
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losses compared to the full sample, especially when we include the zeros in the analysis (column 6).
This indicates that there are less zeros among men, which might suggest that men tend to stay out of
the labor market for a shorter time than women. This is in line with previous research on the topic
on gender differences in employment (Maxwell and D’Amico, 1986; White, 2010).
To find out whether involuntary job losses are the only type of separation that implies a significant
loss, we implement the same econometric specifications to other reasons for separation. Doing so
constitutes an important falsification test for the reliability of our method of identifying an involuntary
separation, because we expect distinct differences in earning losses between involuntary separations and
other reasons. The rationale is that involuntary job losses should be the only reason for a persistent
earning loss because the other separation motives do not imply a depreciation of human capital,
as suggested by Lazear (2009). To verify this hypothesis, we consider three additional motivations:
separation due to (bad) working conditions, separation due to personal or family reasons, and voluntary
leave.
Table 4 presents regression results of equation (3) divided by reason for separation, estimated
by fixed-effects PPML with and without the zeros. For the ease of comparison, we present results
only for annual income losses, but appendix Table A.3 depicts the results for hourly wage and shows
similar patterns. The first important result throughout Table 4 is that no separation reason other
than involuntary job loss implies a permanent wage loss. In detail, we find that separations due to
(bad) working conditions and personal reasons imply small losses (if any), all concentrated around the
year of separation. In terms of magnitude, the marginal effects range between 2 and 4 percent and
there is almost no difference whether we either exclude or include the zeros (except for the effect in
the year of separation due to personal reasons).
For workers who voluntarily quit their jobs we observe a statistically significant increase in wage
in the years following the separation (columns 5 and 6 of table 4). This post-separation increase is
permanent and ranging between 3 to 6 percent depending on the year and whether we include the
zeros in the analysis. This is as expected by Lazear’s skill-weights approach. According to Lazear,
while the expected wage loss is necessarily positive if turnover is involuntary, we should expect a wage
gain for voluntary leavers, because the quitters would be those who find an outside offer from a firm
with a better skill-weight profile. Therefore, we are confident that our way of identifying the type of
separation produces valid results, because it is in line with theory and because results are not sensitive
to alternative specifications.
5.3 The Determinants of Involuntary Separations
In the presence of such relevant losses following an involuntary separation, one corollary question arises:
What determines an involuntary separation? Specifically, we want to investigate whether education
level and education type are associated with a lower probability of involuntary separation. On the
relation between education and involuntary separation, it has been previously shown that education
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has labor market returns such as reduced unemployment risk (Mincer, 1991), shorter unemployment
spells (Kettunen, 1997), and smaller earning losses following a displacement (Eliason and Storrie,
2006; White, 2010). More generally, Farber (2010) finds that while the job loss rate of more educated
workers increased during the period 1984–2002, less educated ones continue to have the highest rates
of job loss overall. We complement these results by analyzing whether this is also valid for involuntary
separations and whether the relation holds for all educational types.
To fill this gap we estimate a Probit model in which the dependent variable equals one if an
individual suffered from involuntary separation during the period 1996–2009 and zero otherwise.19
According to the official definitions of the Swiss State Secretariat for Education and Research, we code
education in three ways according to the highest degree obtained: years of schooling, education level
(primary, secondary, and tertiary), and type of education20 (compulsory, vocational, and academic).
Beyond the educational variables, we include demographic characteristics, region fixed effects, time
fixed effects, and industry fixed effects according to the General Classification of Economic Activities
(NOGA).
Table 5 presents the results. Focusing on the explanatory variables related to education, we
estimate an average marginal effect of –0.4 percentage points for a one-unit increase in years of
schooling (column 1). In terms of predicted probabilities, the overall likelihood of experiencing an
involuntary separation is 7.07 percent. An individual with 9 years of schooling (only compulsory
education) has a predicted probability of experiencing an involuntary job loss of 11.0 percent, which
is significantly higher than the sample average. An individual with 13 years of schooling (high school
degree or vocational maturity) has a 6.2-percent predicted probability of being dismissed, which is
below the sample average and almost half the probability of those holding only a compulsory education
as their highest degree. For individuals who completed a university degree or a higher vocational degree
(18 years of schooling), the predicted probability of experiencing an involuntary job loss is only 5.9
percent. Thus, the more years of education, the better a worker is protected against involuntary job
losses. However, whether it is academic or vocational does not make a difference.
We obtain similar results and predicted probabilities in column 2, where we split education into
primary (base category), secondary, and tertiary levels. According to our estimates, having a tertiary
degree—be it an academic or a vocational tertiary degree—is the best protection against involuntary
job loss, reducing the overall probability of separation by one third. Column 3 focuses on the type
of education, and shows that the worst off are those individuals with only a compulsory education
degree.
19Here we do not claim the estimated effects to be causal, because we suspect the education variables to be endogenous
in the job loss equation. We mitigate this problem by including as many control variables as possible.
20Due to data limitations, we have to ignore individuals with mixed educational paths, i.e., individuals with both
academic and vocational degrees. According to Tuor and Backes-Gellner (2010), the proportion of individuals with a
mixed path in Switzerland are roughly 10 percent of the working population.
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Table 5: Determinants of Involuntary Separation, Probit Models
Variables Involuntary separation Involuntary separation Involuntary separation
dY/dX dY/dX dY/dX
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age squared/100 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tenure (in years) -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure squared/100 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm size ≥ 50 -0.007** -0.007** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Swiss -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.024***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Male 0.007 0.005 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Years of schooling -0.004***
(0.001)
Level of education
Secondary education -0.008
(0.007)
Tertiary education -0.025***
(0.008)
Type of education
Vocational education -0.007
(0.008)
Academic education -0.026***
(0.009)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES
Region fixed effects YES YES YES
(Pseudo) R2 0.170 0.170 0.170
N 67,590 67,590 67,590
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses.
All models include a constant.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
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6 Conclusions
Using Swiss Labor Force Survey data from 1996 to 2009, we estimate the earning and productivity
losses of workers experiencing an involuntary job loss. We introduce a new estimation strategy, the
fixed-effects PPML estimator, which has several advantages compared to conventional fixed-effects
models. Using PPML and including individuals with zero earnings, we find losses of around 30
percent in the year of separation, which then quickly shrink but still remains at roughly 15 percent in
the following years. Our estimates are larger than previous estimates because we are able to include
individuals with zero earnings, thus taking into consideration that their labor productivity is fully lost
during that time.
We also find that while involuntary separations cause permanent scars, the other types of sep-
aration, as expected, cause either light blemishes or even wage gains, as in the case of voluntary
separations. In a second step, we analyzed whether education level or type is related with a lower
probability of involuntary separation. We complement the existing literature and find that tertiary
education—in the form of academic or vocational tertiary education alike—plays a major role in
reducing the risk of job loss.
We are the first study to use fixed-effects PPML to estimate the earning losses after a job sep-
aration, and we contribute to the methodological literature by adding a new (and better) approach
to analyze separation-related losses. The fixed-effects PPML has at least three advantages: First of
all, by using the PPML approach we can identify the total productivity loss following an involun-
tary separation, and not only the post-separation earning loss of workers after they found a new job.
This means that we are also able to account for the time to find a new job and the earnings that
are forgone during that period, with relatively soft assumptions and without manipulating the de-
pendent variable. Second, the PPML is more appropriate when the conditional expectation function
is described by a constant-elasticity model, and it performs very well when the dependent variable
is non-negative. Third, the PPML estimator is consistent to arbitrary heteroskedasticity patterns,
allowing the researcher to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of interest.
Our study could be extended in a number of ways. For example, the event of an involuntary job
loss might not be completely (conditionally) exogenous, which could bias our estimated effects. One
would be particularly worried about time-varying unobservable characteristics that affect a worker’s
performance and thus impact the likelihood of getting dismissed. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find
appropriate exclusion restrictions in the job loss literature, and unless relying on strong assumptions
and using the matrix of (internal) instruments suggested by Hausman and Taylor (1981), we cannot
apply instrumental variable approaches to estimate causal effects. Using matching estimators is also
not very helpful in our case, because we would match individuals according to observable character-
istics, while our true interest would be in individuals’ unobserved traits or at least valid proxies for
such traits. We thus prefer to mitigate the potential endogeneity by filtering out the time-invariant
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heterogeneity among individuals and assuming the impact of bad time-varying unobservables to be
negligible. To further strengthen this claim, we could allow for arbitrary heterogeneity between sep-
arated and non-separated workers in both levels and trends of their unobserved characteristics by
adding a set of worker-specific time trends to our main equations. This technique, already suggested
by Jacobson et al. (1993), does not change the results and our current model fits the data much
better.21
To conclude, in this paper we were interested in the window of risks and opportunities that indi-
viduals face after an involuntary separation. Our estimates suggest that a window of opportunity does
indeed open following a job separation, because most of the individuals find a job after a separation.
However, it is not another door that opens but rather a small window, because after the door closes
individuals are faced with earning losses that last at least for another four years. This result highlights
the importance of reducing the likelihood of an involuntary job loss before it happens, given the near
impossibility of avoiding persistent losses once the involuntary separation occurs. A better education,
be it in the form of academic or vocational alike, helps to prevent such involuntary job losses.
21Regression output available upon request.
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